The Economic Power of Transnational Organized Crime in Putumayo

Abstract

This article examines how illicit economies and cross-border mobility enable armed organizations to exercise economic power and forms of social regulation in the Putumayo basin. The problem is not merely a matter of a supposed “absence of the State”: it stems from a combination of river corridors that are difficult to control, the territorial concentration of coca cultivation, informal markets, persistent gaps in public services, and State responses fragmented by borders and institutional jurisdictions. Through a qualitative and triangulated review of academic literature, early warning reports, official statistics, regulations, technical reports, and journalistic investigations, the article distinguishes between verified facts in the Putumayo, documented regional connections, and hypotheses that still require judicial investigation. The evidence confirms the conflict between the Carolina Ramírez Front and the Border Commandos, as well as controls over mobility, communications, and trade on the Colombian side. However, it does not demonstrate that gold has replaced cocaine as Putumayo’s primary illicit economy, nor that the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) or the Comando Vermelho directly control local mining operations. It is argued that the strategic risk stems from five mechanisms: jurisdictional arbitrage, illicit rents, criminal governance, unequal State weakness, and vulnerability to co-optation. The proposed response links each mechanism to verifiable measures and indicators, prioritizing permanent river patrols, financial investigations, traceability, public services, legal alternatives for young people, and institutional integrity.